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Abstract 
Although harming people is generally wrong, it is exceptionally justified 
as the lesser evil when it is done to prevent sufficiently more serious 
harm.  The two aspects of this moral truth should be reflected in the law.  
This is not always an easy task and is especially difficult with respect to 
the powers of the executive branch of government concerning 
emergencies.  In such situations, there may be strong reasons to confer 
wide powers to the executive branch to perform harmful actions as the 
lesser evil.  However, strong reasons exist to curb and check such powers.  
However, this problem is especially relevant in the context of the struggle 
against terrorism, where radical means are often suggested, and 
sometimes used, to confront what are considered to be, and sometimes 
are, grave dangers on lesser evil grounds.  The paper explores this 
problem and offers a partial solution. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
629 
                                                                
According to every plausible moral theory, performing actions that harm people 
is generally wrong.  According to these same theories, however, actions that harm 
people may be justified as the lesser evil when committed to prevent a sufficiently 
more serious harm to other people.  The content of this rudimentary idea of lesser 
1Bachelor of Law, summa cum laude, 1996, Master of Law, magna cum laude, 1998, 
Doctor of Law, 2002, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  Post Doctorate Research Fellow, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2002-2003; Visiting Researcher, Harvard University, 
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evil is complex and disputed among different moral theorists.2  But the rudimentary 
idea of lesser evil itself, i.e., the idea that there must be some place for the notion of 
lesser evil, is no doubt true and is widely accepted.  Once a certain threshold has 
been crossed with respect to the absolute and relative importance of the competing 
interests, every plausible moral theory would acknowledge the strong justification 
for harmful actions in the interpersonal sphere.  A paradigmatic example is the 
justification for the destruction of trivial property of one person in order to save the 
life of another.  As Aristotle wrote, "anyone with any sense" would perform such an 
action.3  
The two aspects of this moral truth–that harming people is generally wrong but 
exceptionally justified for the prevention of sufficiently more severe harms—should 
in principle be reflected in the law.  The law should not necessarily reflect every 
moral judgment, since some moral judgments could not be significantly furthered by 
their incorporation into the law.  Furthermore, others are simply not important 
enough to justify their incorporation into the law in light of the cost of legal 
enforcement.4  However, these considerations are either not relevant or not decisive 
in the context of interpersonal conflicts involving basic interests threatened by 
serious adverse effects.  Therefore, the moral conclusions regarding the content and 
scope of the notion of lesser evil with respect to such interests are generally directly 
applicable to the law.  Indeed, although there is disagreement regarding the proper 
limits of law, it is widely agreed that it should at least reflect moral judgments with 
respect to the protection of important interests of people from harm.5  While this idea 
                                                                
2My view regarding the proper content, and accordingly the boundaries, of the concept of 
lesser evil is elaborated in Re'em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness PHIL. STUD. (forthcoming 
2006); Re'em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the Distribution of Scarce Health Resources, 
30 J. MED. & PHIL. 231-60 (2005); Re'em Segev, Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense, 
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 383-460 (2005);  Re'em Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil: Beyond 
Deontology, Rights and Utilitarianism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Re'em 
Segev, The Significance of Numbers: Intrinsic and Comprehensive or Instrumental and 
Restricted? (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
3The classic illustration for this kind of action is Aristotle's discussion of the jettison of 
cargo overboard from a ship caught in a storm in order to save the lives of the sailors.  See 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 30 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 1999). 
4Notice that a parallel condition might be relevant also in the moral sphere, so that only 
reasons beyond some threshold of importance should be the basis for moral norms.  See 
SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 68 (1989). Obviously, however, the threshold in 
the legal sphere should be higher in light of the additional cost of legal regulation.  
       A different kind of difference, that I will return to later, concerns the formulation of 
norms.  Typically, there are especially strong  reasons for formulating the law in advance in 
the form of open and relatively clear rules.  This might occasionally justify, for example, less 
precision at the margins for the sake of clarity. 
5The classic articulation of the position that the prevention of harm to people other than 
the agent is the only justified aim for the use of coercion, including through the law, is JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) 
(1859). 
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presents various difficult questions regarding its proper content and boundaries,6 its 
hard core seems obviously justified and widely accepted.  The main dispute is 
whether the law should go beyond it.7  
The idea that the law should reflect moral judgments regarding protecting 
individuals from harm includes the two aspects of the moral truth just mentioned.  
Harming people is generally wrong, but it is exceptionally justified for the 
prevention of sufficiently more severe harms.  Thus, the law should generally forbid 
or otherwise discourage the performance of actions that harm people but permit and 
encourage such actions when they are justified as the lesser evil.  It is not, however, 
always easy to incorporate this conclusion into the law.  One problem concerns the 
proper limits of the law, since it is difficult to determine which actions are harmful 
enough to justify invoking the law to try to prevent them.  Another problem concerns 
a central aspect of morality: it is difficult to determine which harmful actions are 
justified as the lesser evil.  While it is widely accepted that the idea of lesser evil, as 
a rudimentary concept, is valid, this concept is in itself almost empty and does not 
provide much more guidance than the prescription to "act rightly."  The crucial 
question is thus which substantive conception of lesser evil should be adopted.  The 
answer to this question, however, is disputed among different moral theorists.8
This paper does not address these questions in their general form.  The main aim 
of the paper is rather to explore the question of how the law should reflect and 
elaborate the idea of lesser evil in the administrative sphere, namely, with respect to 
the powers of the executive branch of the government.  In other words, the question 
addressed in this paper is what kinds of lesser evil powers should be bestowed upon 
executive authorities.  Particularly, should the concept of lesser evil, in its 
rudimentary and general form, or some general substantive conception of lesser evil 
be an independent source of executive power? In other words, should executive 
officeholders then be authorized to act, in their public role,9 directly in light of broad 
and vague principles of lesser evil?10
                                                                
6For a brief survey of some of the main problems of Mill's Harm Principle, see JOHN 
GRAY, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS xv, xv-xxi (John 
Gray ed., Oxford Univ.Press 1998). 
7For discussions of the legitimacy of other grounds for the use of the law, see 1 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENCE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988); H. L. 
A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).  
8The distinction between these two levels of generalization, as reflected in the notions 
"concept" and "conception," follows H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-56 (1961); 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-6 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971); and RONALD DWORKIN, 
Constitutional Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131, 134-35 (1977).  
9 In various kinds of situations, public officeholders might not act in their official capacity. 
Their position is then like that of any other person.  It should be noted, however, that the 
boundaries of an official role are typically blurred.  There are clear cases in which a person 
encounters a situation that either is obviously within his public role or clearly has nothing to 
do with it.  There are, however, also intermediate cases in which there is a connection between 
the agent's public role and the situation.  It might then be difficult to determine whether the 
agent should be considered as acting in his official capacity or not.  Pertinent factors include, 
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The assumption underlying this paper is that it is generally preferable that 
executive actions be guided by rules that set relatively detailed standards rather than 
be carried out in light of unfettered or wide discretion of executive officials.  The 
reason is that rules encourage rational thinking and thus improve the probability of 
reaching correct decisions.  Rule-based decisions typically have several advantages 
over decisions made with unfettered or wide discretion.  First, rules encourage 
general and methodical thinking that strives to identify and properly respond to the 
relevant factors.  Second, general thinking, in the form of predetermined rules, 
enables the gathering of empirical data that can be used as the basis for future 
decisions.  It is often impossible or, at least, more difficult to gather such data in the 
face of a specific decision due to lack of time.  Finally, detailed rules enable 
assessment of actions.  The ability to critique action in light of guidelines will 
improve the chance of making the right decisions in the future. For these reasons, 
rules reduce the dangers of mistake, arbitrariness and abuse of power.11 Rules for the 
guidance of executive actions can be set by the legislature, the courts or the 
executive bodies themselves.  However, there are reasons to distinguish between 
rules set by different branches of the government.  I will return to this point in the 
following sections. 
                                                           
 
for example, whether the resolution of the situation requires qualifications that are necessary 
for the performance of the agent's official role, and whether the situation occurs in the time 
and place in which the agent is required to perform his public duties. 
10It is important to note one point concerning the meaning of a public authorization in 
terms of permission, justification, and duty. Contrary to the common view that considers these 
categories as crucial in the moral sphere, I believe that the only substantive category is that of 
justification (for reasons explained in Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil: Beyond Deontology, 
Rights and Utilitarianism, supra note 2).  This distinction is, however, clearly significant in the 
legal sphere with respect to the actions of private individuals, due to the two differences 
between the proper scope of morality and law.  Since some moral judgments are either not 
important enough to justify their incorporation into the law in light of the price of legal 
enforcement, or could not be significantly furthered by their incorporation into the law, there 
is a place for legal rules that permits the performance of certain justified actions but do not 
proscribe their performance.  It is therefore important to note that, in my opinion, this 
distinction has no place, even in the legal sphere, in the administrative realm.  A legal 
authorization of a public official to perform a certain action implies permission, justification, 
and a duty to perform this action.  This is so since the aim of an authorization to perform an 
action in certain circumstances is that this action would be performed in the stipulated 
circumstances.  Therefore, public officials should be required to execute the relevant legal 
rules in their sphere of responsibility.  This point might be clouded in contexts where the 
standards of authorization are vague, so that the relevant public officials have wide discretion 
in their implementation.  But the nature, and particularly the width, of administrative 
discretion are in principle irrelevant in this respect.  If a proper employment of the discretion, 
whether narrow or wide, leads to the conclusion that standards set by the law are met, then this 
conclusion implies not only permission or justification but also a duty to act accordingly.  
11Cf. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE - A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1971) 
("[T]he greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where 
rules and principles provide little or no guidance . . . ."); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. 
KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURE FROM LEGAL RULES 171-
77 (1973). 
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The problem is that it might be difficult to set detailed rules in advance that 
provide a good solution to the problem at hand.  This problem particularly exists 
with respect to the powers of the executive.  For this reason, some level of executive 
discretion, including significant normative discretion, might be necessary for the 
performance of various actions that are practically impossible to foresee and 
establish proper rules for them.12  This familiar insight sets the stage for several 
crucial questions concerning the proper nature of executive discretion.13  First, what 
are the areas in which significant discretion should be bestowed upon executive 
officeholders?  Second, what goals warrant that significant executive discretion 
should be granted for their promotion, despite its cost? Third, what is the proper 
scope of executive discretion in each context? Fourth, what, if any, should be the 
legislative, judicial or administrative standards in light of which executive discretion 
should be exercised in each context?14 Finally, what is the best way to monitor the 
exercise of such executive discretion? 
The special features of the lesser evil aspect of these general questions are 
derived from the nature of the concept of lesser evil, which justifies the infliction of 
harms on individuals in order to prevent more serious harms to others.  This aspect 
of the problem is important since it has wide implications in light of the wide 
potential of every plausible conception of lesser evil, given the number of contexts 
where it might apply.  Indeed, the importance of this aspect of the above questions 
was recently emphasized in the context of the struggle against terrorism, where 
radical means are often suggested, and sometimes used, in order to confront what are 
considered to be, and sometimes apparently are, grave dangers on lesser evil 
grounds.15  Recent examples of measures that were considered and sometimes 
employed are the indefinite detention of individuals suspected of being involved in 
                                                                
12See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 11-52 (3rd ed. 1972); 
DAVIS, supra note 11, at 15-21, 27-51; RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35-42 (4th 
ed. 2002). 
13Cf. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 43; KADISH & KADISH, supra note 11, at 43. 
14Discretion employed in light of standards is a "weak discretion" in Ronald Dworkin's 
terminology, but it might nevertheless be a substantial discretion.  See RONALD DWORKIN, The 
Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at 14-45. 
15For a recent exposition of the view that in the struggle against terrorism "thinking about 
lesser evils is unavoidable," see Michael Ignatieff, Lesser Evils, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 2, 
2004, at 46:  
Sticking too firmly to the rule of law simply allows terrorists too much leeway to 
exploit our freedoms.  Abandoning the rule of law altogether betrays our most valued 
institutions.  To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of 
suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even pre-emptive war.  
These are evils because each strays from national and international law and because 
they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process.  They can be 
justified only because they prevent the greater evil.  The question is not whether we 
should be trafficking in lesser evils but whether we can keep lesser evils under the 
control of free institutions. If we can't, any victories we gain in the war on terror will 
be Pyrrhic ones. 
See also Anthony Lewis, Bush and the Lesser Evil, 51 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 9, 9-12 (2004) (book 
review); see generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR (2004). 
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terrorist activity, without judicial review or disclosure of their identities,16 and 
employment of extreme interrogation methods in order to extract information about 
terrorist organizations and impending terrorist acts.17
Authorizing the executive branch to act on lesser evil grounds provokes a clash 
between conflicting rationales.  On the one hand, there are strong reasons to give 
wide and flexible powers to executive officials to act on lesser evil grounds that will 
enable them to confront various emergencies where harmful actions might be 
justified as the lesser evil.  On the other hand, there are also strong reasons to curb 
and check the powers of public officials. This is especially true in the context of 
harmful actions performed on lesser evil grounds.  Therefore, incorporating into 
administrative law the concept of moral justification to perform certain actions 
should be carefully studied.  
There is no easy solution to this clash. This paper emphasizes its existence by 
presenting the reasons for and against granting wide executive powers to act on 
lesser evil grounds.  It also discusses positions taken by various legal systems in this 
regard, elaborating particularly on the reliance in Israel on the concept of lesser evil 
as a basis for the use of force in interrogations in order to prevent acts of terror.  
Finally, it suggests a way to alleviate the tension between the clashing considerations 
to a certain extent, based on the idea of powers to act on lesser evil grounds that 
include guidelines that are intermediate in their level of generality. 
Before embarking, two preliminary points in the following section concern the 
proper place and scope of the concept of lesser evil as a basis for legal authorization 
of executive officeholders.  While the law should no doubt accord some place to a 
                                                                
16See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, 51 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 26, 26-29 
(2004) (book review) (reviewing the three decisions made by the United States Supreme Court 
on June 28, 2004); Lyle Denniston, High Court to Hear Detainees' Appeals, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2003, at A2; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Policy of Silence on 9/11 
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A6 (discussing the Supreme Court’s approval of the 
government’s refusal to disclose the identities of hundreds of people arrested by the United 
States government on the ground that "[a] complete list of the names 'would give terrorist 
organizations a composite picture of the government investigation'"); Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court Hears the Case of Guantánamo, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004 at A1. 
17See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal,  51 N. Y. REV. BOOKS 4, 4-7 (2004); 
Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A1; 
Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture 'May Be Justified', WASH. POST, June 13, 2004, 
at A03 (including a Justice Department memo from August 2002 that explores the justification 
for torture in interrogations); Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for 
Use of Torture: Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A01; Dana 
Priest & Joe Stephens, Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations, WASH. POST, May 9, 
2004, at A01; Michael Hirsh, New Torture Furor: A Defense Dept. Memo Provides a 
Legal Roadmap for Prisoner Interrogation, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 2004, available at 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5167122/site/newsweek/ (including a Defense Department memo 
from March 2003 which "explores ways of conducting interrogations in the war on terror that 
would allow guards to evade future prosecutions for torture").  For a discussion of this 
phenomenon in Israel, in the context of lesser evil, see Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re'em Segev, 
Interrogational Torture: A Question of Proper Authorization or a Substantive Moral Issue? 34 
ISR. L. REV. 509-559 (2000); Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re'em Segev, Using Force During 
Investigations by the General Security Service - The Lesser Evil? 4 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL –
(LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL) 667-728 (1998) (in Hebrew). 
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concept of lesser evil, there are two possible distinctions between the scope of the 
justification of individuals and of governmental authorities to act on lesser evil 
grounds.  
II.  THE SCOPE OF A LEGAL POWER TO ACT ON LESSER EVIL GROUNDS 
As previously discussed, the moral concept of the lesser evil should be 
incorporated into the law.  There might be, however, two differences regarding the 
scope of the moral and the institutional legal conception of lesser evil.  These 
differences concern two questions.  First, what should the law be?  Second, what is 
the law in a certain legal system? 
The first point concerns the proper scope of a legal conception of lesser evil. 
Since some harmful actions are justified as the lesser evil, there is a reason to 
encourage the performance of such actions.  This reason could be furthered, with 
respect to actions of public officials, by empowering them to perform such actions. 
This conclusion should be, however, qualified in one respect.  Namely, there is a 
potential difference regarding the scope of the justification between individuals and 
governmental authorities to act on lesser evil grounds.  There might be a distinction 
between, on the one hand, the justification for private individuals to perform certain 
actions and, on the other hand, the justification for enacting a law authorizing public 
officials to perform the same actions, as well as the actual performance of such 
actions by public officials.  This distinction is not based on an agent-relative view, 
which is typically adopted by deontological theories and theories of rights, that 
determines the justification for actions directly based on the identity of the agent. 
Rather, this distinction is based on the influence of the identity of the potential agent 
on the indirect effects of actions that should generally be taken into account when 
evaluating the justification of actions.  
Particularly, actions of governmental officials—including the enactment of legal 
rules—typically have indirect effects that actions of other individuals lack.  Such 
actions are typically considered by many individuals as an expression of what is 
proper and legal to do.  Therefore, such actions often send a message of legitimating 
actions of the same or similar kind that might extend to other contexts.  This aspect is 
especially significant with regard to the concept of lesser evil, since it concerns 
harmful actions that are typically wrong and only exceptionally justified. While the 
performance of certain harmful actions might be exceptionally justified as the lesser 
evil in light of their direct effects, a law permitting or authorizing the performance of 
the same actions, as well as the actual performance of such actions by public 
officials, might be unjustified due to the negative indirect effects of such 
governmental actions. The negative indirect effects could be legitimizing harmful 
actions that might extend to contexts where they are unjustified even in terms of their 
direct effects.18
                                                                
18 In light of these considerations, Sanford Kadish suggests that there are cases where  
there is a lesser evil justification for the performance of certain actions by private individuals, 
but not for a law permitting or authorizing such actions.  Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State 
and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 351-56 (1989). Kadish’s claim is that while the use of 
force in interrogations as a means of extracting information that might help prevent acts of 
terror and thus save people's lives might be justified by individuals, a law permitting or 
authorizing such actions is unjustified. Id. 
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The possibility of such a gap between what is justified for individuals on lesser 
evil grounds and what is justified for the state to legislate certainly exists in light of 
the special adverse indirect effects governmental actions typically have.  This 
possibility is not, however, a solid basis for a complete rejection of the concept of 
lesser evil as a foundation for administrative actions.  Even taking the indirect 
adverse effects of legitimizing harmful activities into account, there is no doubt that 
some actions by governmental authorities are justified on lesser evil grounds.  The 
enactment of laws authorizing executive officeholders to perform certain actions on 
lesser evil grounds is one such example.  
The possibility and the implications of special indirect effects of legal 
authorization for public officeholders to perform harmful actions as the lesser evil 
should therefore be explored as part of the answer to the central question of how the 
law should reflect the idea of lesser evil in the administrative sphere. The 
considerations discussed in this section should be taken into account in determining 
the nature and content of administrative powers to act on lesser evil grounds.  At 
issue is the proper level of generality of executive authorization to act on lesser evil 
grounds.  That is, how much discretion should the executive officeholder have to 
follow the idea of lesser evil in its general and rudimentary form? 
The second preliminary point concerns the scope of a concept of lesser evil 
within an operating legal system.  In considering the proper limits and form of a law 
regarding the concept of lesser evil, one must recognize that the prevailing law might 
limit the concept of lesser evil in various respects.  This implication is the main 
difference between moral and legal norms.  The validity of moral norms is 
exclusively a function of their proper content; the right action is the one that best 
reflects all appropriate reasons for actions.  But the validity of legal rules, according 
to every reasonable legal theory and according to every modern legal theory, is not 
only a function of the answer to the question of what should be their content. Rather, 
the validity of legal norms is, at least partly, the function of other considerations 
relating to the actions of political institutions such as parliaments and courts that are 
considered to have the power to make legal norms.  To be sure, according to every 
plausible legal theory, the answer to the question of what should be the law is an 
important element in the identification of the prevailing law, especially with respect 
to vague legal rules or in contexts that are not governed by legal rules.  But this 
element could not always be decisive, since otherwise the actions of political 
institutions, that affect the lives of individuals, would be ignored.  This point is not 
disputed among various legal theorists who differ only in the place they assign to 
institutional actions.  Some theorists consider certain institutional actions as both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for the legal validity of norms, such as legal 
positivism19 and legal realism.20  Other theorists consider institutional action only as 
                                                                
19See HART, supra note 8, at 79-117; H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
20See, e.g., J. W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES ch. 8 (1980); Felix Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Karl Llewellyn, 
Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) . 
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a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, such as various conceptions of natural 
law theories21 and the theory suggested by Ronald Dworkin.22  
Therefore, the conclusion that a certain action or rule is justified as the lesser 
evil, while a necessary and sufficient condition for a moral norm, and generally 
should be reflected in law, does not, by itself, entail that there is a legal norm that 
reflects this conclusion.  A general or specific conception of lesser evil will be part 
of the law if two conditions are met. First, there is a legal norm—either a general 
principle or a specific rule—that grounds the idea of lesser evil, either in a general 
form or with respect to a particular issue. Second, this norm must not contradict 
another legal norm that must prevail, according to the rules of the relevant legal 
system concerning contradictions of norms.  The second condition is especially 
relevant to a general legal norm justified on the basis of lesser evil.  Such a general 
norm might be subject to more specific legal norms in light of the common rule that, 
when two norms contradict each other, the more specific one prevails.23  However, 
since many legal norms that reflect the concept of lesser evil are wide and 
ambiguous, the conclusions regarding the proper conception of lesser evil remains an 
important element in the interpretation and completion of the law, as well as in its 
constitutional scrutiny, in this context.  
III.  REASONS SUPPORTING WIDE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF LESSER EVIL 
There are several reasons for bestowing wide powers upon executive authorities 
that would enable them to act with unfettered, or at least broad, discretion with 
respect to the question of which harmful actions are justified as the lesser evil.  
The first reason concerns a common feature of rules in general and rules of law in 
particular.  Classical writers like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as well as modern 
writers have identified that rules are inherently imperfect. It is impossible, or at least 
impractical, to identify in advance proper normative decisions regarding all kinds of 
situations that require special normative arrangement.24 Particularly, it might be at 
                                                                
21See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 1-50, 260-91 (1980); LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-99 (1964); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958);. 
22See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 7 (1986);  RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of 
Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 8, at 14-45. 
23This idea is reflected in various qualifications for legal principles or rules of lesser evil. 
See, for example, the qualifications suggested by the American Law Institute to a general 
criminal defense of lesser evil. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 
1985) ("[N]either the [Model Penal] Code nor other law defining the offense provides 
exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved."); § 3.02(1)(c) ("[A] 
legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear."). 
Compare to the qualification for the lesser evil ("justifying necessity") defense in the German 
penal law, according to which the defense does not apply when the law determines a special 
way of protecting the relevant interest. See Klaus Bernsmann, Private Self-Defence and 
Necessity in German Penal Law and in the Penal Law Proposal - Some Remarks, 30 ISR. L. 
REV. 171, 182 (1996). 
24Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas both write that rules of law are often general and refer 
explicitly only to typical situations, rather than to exceptional circumstances or emergencies. 
Therefore, they suggest, it might be required to complete the explicit law in such exceptional 
circumstances, in light of its aim. See 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 235 (Fathers 
 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
638 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:629 
least practically impossible to refer to all kinds of exceptional circumstances where 
there might be justification for the performance of harmful actions on lesser evil 
grounds.25 In light of this difficulty, the only way to enable the performance of such 
justifiable actions is to set wide executive powers to act on lesser evil grounds.  This 
difficulty might even entail granting sweeping power to all public officeholder to 
perform any action that is, in their opinion, in accordance with general principles of 
lesser evil. 
The imperfection of rules is a familiar problem. Still, it should not be 
exaggerated. In one respect, this problem is more serious for private individuals than 
public officials and particularly executive officials. The difference between public 
officials and other individuals, in this respect, stems from the fundamental distinction 
between the liberty of individuals and the power of governmental authorities. 
Generally, individuals possess the liberty to engage in any kind of activity unless 
there is a good ground for limiting this liberty, such as to prevent harm to others.  On 
the other hand, government bodies should have the power to act only when there is a 
good reason to perform certain actions. This idea is embodied in one aspect of the 
Principle of Legality, which states that public officials are permitted to perform only 
actions that the law authorizes them to perform.  
One aspect of this distinction between the scope of individual liberty and 
governmental power is not relevant to the justification to perform actions as the 
lesser evil. This distinction implies that action that there is neither reason to forbid 
nor to encourage should be allowed for individuals, but should not be included in the 
power of government authorities This point is not applicable to actions performed on 
lesser evil grounds, since there is both a good reason to forbid such actions—the 
harm they cause—and a good reason to encourage their performance—the 
prevention of more severe harm. 
Another aspect of the distinction between individual liberty and governmental 
power is, however, relevant to the notion of lesser evil.  An individual who is not 
acting in an official capacity has the liberty to act in countless contexts. This 
individual might, hypothetically, encounter an enormous variety of possible 
emergencies in which harmful action might be justified. For this reason, the law, 
especially the criminal law, often includes defenses that consist of general standards 
of justification, which exempt harmful actions performed by individuals on the basis 
of the lesser evil.  Examples are explicit lesser evil defenses that include only very 
                                                           
 
of the English Dominican Province trans., Daniel J. Sullivan rev., Encyc. Britannica 1952); 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1137b. For modern discussion of this problem see ALAN 
DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 73-74 (1977); H. L. A. HART  THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
124-36 (2nd ed. 1994); KADISH & KADISH, supra note 11, at 177-78. For this problem in the 
administrative sphere see especially DAVIS, supra note 12, at 23, 30; DAVIS, supra note 11, at 
37-39. 
25For this problem in related contexts, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
LAW 790 (1978); LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 48-49 (1987); George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: ‘Jury 
Nullification’ and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1307 (1974). 
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general and vague conditions,26 or even more open-ended defenses, like the common 
law or statutory defenses of necessity and duress.27
On the other hand, the problem of identifying possible situations in advance 
where executive officials might be justified in performing harmful actions is 
somewhat less difficult than the parallel problem with respect to individuals.  There 
is a fundamental distinction between the liberty of individuals and the power of 
executive authorities. In light of the Principle of Legality, every public official is 
permitted to act only in a certain domain prescribed to him by law. Moreover, the 
point of setting up an executive body and entrusting it with powers is that its officials 
will perform certain actions in certain kinds of situations.  Therefore, the kinds of 
actions that executive officials might be justified in performing in their official 
capacity are typically prescribed by law, either in legislation or in bylaws or in 
administrative guidelines.  Furthermore, the experience acquired through the 
continuous operation of executive authorities, each in its domain of responsibility, 
can often help in identifying the kinds of conflicts that might arise in various 
domains.  This would also help in formulating legal rules of authorization with 
regard to the kinds of actions that executive officials should perform in these 
situations on lesser evil grounds. 
For these reasons, it seems that most emergencies that might arise, within the 
domain of operation of each executive authority, could be anticipated and thus 
specifically regulated in law. Indeed, it seems that the law often prescribes specific 
rules that give detailed content to the general idea of lesser evil in various contexts.  
For example, Glanville Williams explains that in England,  
                                                                
26An example is the lesser evil defense suggested by the American Law Institute. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1985) ("Conduct which the actor 
believes to be necessary to avoid harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided 
that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offence charged."). This defense was the model for many 
lesser evil defenses in the United States. See Peter D. W. Heberling, Justification: The Impact 
of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914 (1975).  For another 
example of a lesser evil defense, see 28 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, PENAL 
CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 34 (Sweet & Maxwell 1987) (1975).  
("[W]hoever commits an act in order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger 
to the life, limb, liberty, honor, property or other legal interest of himself or of another does 
not act unlawfully if, taking into consideration all the conflicting interests, in particular the 
legal ones, and the degree of danger involved, the interest protected by him significantly 
outweighs the interest which he harms. This rule applies only if the act is an appropriate 
means to avert the danger."). See also LARS BO LANGSTED, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW IN 
DENMARK (1998) (quoting Penal Code of Denmark § 13) ("The offence committed through 
the act of necessity must be such that it can be regarded as only of relatively minor 
importance."). 
27The clearest defense in this respect is the necessity defense, since it does not involve 
considerations of responsibility, either of the people whose interests are involved in the 
conflict, as in the paradigm case of self-defense against an unjustified and culpable aggressor, 
or of people who are the source of the initial danger, as in the cases covered by the defense of 
duress.  For a survey of the range of situations in which the lesser evil aspect of the defense of 
necessity was relied upon, see Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of 
Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 289, 290-91 (1974). 
 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
640 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:629 
firemen, the police and ambulances are expressly exempted from speed 
limits, and the regulations allow them to treat the red light merely as a 
'Give Way' sign if observance of the signal 'would be likely to hinder the 
use of that vehicle for the purposes for which it is being used on that 
occasion.28
Williams notes that before this law was enacted, a court  “denied (obiter) that 
necessity could justify the driver of a fire-engine in crossing against the lights, even 
to save life.” He expresses the following view:  
This is understandable, since the question of a fire-engine crossing against 
the lights is not one of unforeseen emergency but of proper practice on the 
part of the fire service; if an exemption were though proper, it was to be 
expected that the legislature would make it—as it afterwards did.29  
At this point we should also note the possibility of administrative, rather than 
legislative or judicial, rules set by executive officials themselves for the guidance of 
subordinates. In light of the inevitability of substantial executive discretion, 
administrative guidelines are important since they determine the way executive 
bodies function in many domains. Like rules in general, administrative guidelines 
have important advantages over employing unfettered discretion in specific 
occasions. Such guidelines decrease the dangers of mistake, arbitrariness and abuse 
of power.30 In the context of the idea of lesser evil, there are areas where it is 
difficult to set legislative or judicial guidelines regarding the kinds of executive 
actions that might be justified on lesser evil grounds.  Here, it might be more 
practical for each executive body to set administrative guidelines concerning its area 
of responsibility.  It might be easier to translate the experience acquired by executive 
authorities—at least at the first stage—to administrative guidelines, compared to 
legislative or judicial guidelines.  This option is easier due to the complexity and 
time involved in the processes of legislation and adjudication.  Additionally, 
administrative guidelines are more flexible than the more rigid legislative or judicial 
decisions. Therefore, one way that an executive body can carry out its duty to 
prepare for various situations that may arise in its area of responsibility is to set 
administrative guidelines concerning the actions that officials should perform in 
conflicts on lesser evil grounds.  These guidelines should be developed in light of the 
experience and expertise the executive body has acquired over time in this domain. It 
should be remembered, however, that administrative guidelines are not equivalent to 
legislative or to judicial guidelines in several respects that are discussed in the next 
section. 
It thus seems that the difficulty in identifying in advance all types of harmful 
actions that might be justified in exceptional circumstances as the lesser evil is less 
serious for executive bodies as compared to individuals.  Nevertheless, it is 
implausible to deny that this difficulty might exist for executive bodies and at times 
                                                                
28 GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 608-09 (2d ed.1983) (footnotes 
omitted). 
29 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
30The importance of administrative rules or guidelines in general is emphasized in DAVIS, 
supra note 12, at 44-46, and DAVIS, supra note 11, at 55-70. 
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be significant.31 Therefore, wide executive powers to act on general lesser evil 
considerations might be the only way to enable executive officials to perform certain 
justified actions that might prevent morally unjustified harms to individuals. The 
importance of such wide powers depends on the absolute and relative importance of 
the interests that might be at stake. Such powers might be very important if they 
could save important interests at the price of relatively trivial interest, for example, 
when it is possible to save a person's life by harming another person's trivial 
property. 
In light of the inherent imperfection of rules there are strong additional reasons to 
empower executive officials to perform actions in their area of responsibility that 
they consider justified as the lesser evil.  Specifically, executive officials are 
typically in a relatively good position, in comparison to other individuals, to protect 
important interests successfully.  One characteristic that puts executive officeholders 
in an especially good position to confront emergencies in their sphere of 
responsibility is that they have the skills and resources necessary to resolve 
emergencies successfully. Executive officers can therefore typically save the 
endanger interests at the lowest cost.  
A different reason why public officials, including executives, are typically in a 
better position to resolve emergencies successfully is that they are more likely to be 
impartial compared to the individuals involved in the conflict.  There are two reasons 
for this assumption.  First, public officials, as trustees of the public, are expected to 
be impartial, and it might be assumed that at least some officials internalize this 
special requirement to a significant extent. Second, public officials are probably less 
likely to be personally involved in the situations they encounter in their official 
capacity compared to other individuals.  Their interests as individuals would 
typically not be affected by the way the conflict is resolved.  Unlike executive 
officials who are required to seek out and attend situations where their duties oblige 
them to act, it might be assumed that other individuals who will have the opportunity 
and inclination to act in these kind of situations would often be those who have a 
personal interest in their resolution, rather than an official one.  The concern for 
unjustified special personal preference is thus less substantial with respect to public, 
including executive, officials.  
A different kind of reason for bestowing wide powers upon executive bodies to 
act on lesser evil considerations concerns the public trust in the government.  As 
already noted, the fundamental reason for granting wide powers is that it will enable 
executive authorities to perform actions that are considered to be justified as the 
lesser evil and thus will prevent unnecessary harm.  Another reason is that if 
governmental authorities do not perform actions that are widely considered justified 
as the lesser evil, especially within their area of responsibility, this might adversely 
affect the public trust in the relevant authority and perhaps in the government in 
general. This result might happen even if the reason for the authority’s failure to act 
is the absence of power to perform the action at hand, since many people might 
consider this an overly formalistic insistence on technical rules of authorization. 
Finally, even when it is possible in advance to identify situations where harmful 
actions by executive authorities might be justified, there could be reasons not to 
                                                                
31For what seems to me an exaggerated claim that the idea of lesser evil has no place in the 
public sphere since executive powers are defined by specific laws, see Jerome E. Bickenbach, 
The Defence of Necessity, 13 CAN. J. PHIL. 79, 84 (1983). 
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reflect all these conclusions explicitly in the law. One reason might be that 
vagueness regarding the executive authorities’ power might have advantages in 
certain contexts. This vagueness could be achieved by the allocation of wide or 
general powers.  Such claims are often made when discussing the powers of 
authorities that are responsible for security.  One context where this occurs is 
combating terrorism.32 It should be noted, however, that this reason also tends to be 
exaggerated.  It is important to be cautious and aware of the tendency of institutions, 
including governmental institutions, to overstate considerations of secrecy, 
especially in the context of national security. 
In conclusion, there are reasons to bestow wide powers upon executive 
authorities to perform harmful actions on lesser evil grounds. Although some of 
these reasons tend to be overstated, they nevertheless present a strong case for 
granting public, and particularly executive, officials wide powers of lesser evil.  This 
is particularly true at times where an omission on the part of the relevant authority 
might have serious adverse consequences.  Again, such claims are sometimes made 
with respect to executive authorities responsible for national security. 
IV.  REASONS AGAINST WIDE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF LESSER EVIL 
In many respects, the allocation of general and vague executive powers to act on 
lesser evil grounds has come at a price. The reasons against bestowing wide powers 
upon executive authorities to act with unfettered or wide discretion in emergencies 
are mostly second order reasons.  They are concerned with the way decisions are 
made regarding the implementation of the concept of lesser evil and particularly the 
identity of the decision-maker. A decision regarding when performing harmful 
actions as the lesser evil is justified, and who should perform such actions when they 
are justified, is necessary.  After all, not making a decision in this context has 
significant implications, namely, allowing harm that can and should be avoided, to 
take place. Thus, not making a decision is, in this important sense, a decision.  The 
questions are thus how to make this decision and particularly who should make the 
decision. These are important questions in many contexts.  They are especially 
significant with respect to the implementation of the notion of lesser evil. While it is 
widely agreed that the rudimentary concept of lesser evil is valid, there is substantial 
disagreement concerning the question of which substantive conception of lesser evil 
should be adopted. Moreover, even if some general conception of lesser evil is 
adopted, its interpretation and implementation require substantial discretion, due to 
the wide potential of any such conception. 
As emphasized earlier, detailed rules are generally preferable over unfettered 
discretion in the context of executive action.  Yet it is difficult to set detailed 
guidelines with respect to the notion of lesser evil. This section will concentrate on 
the second order considerations as they relate to the identity of the decision-maker, 
in light of the democratic conception of government and the division of work it 
implies, and to the related problems of mistake, inequality, abuse of power and the 
special indirect effects of governmental powers.  These considerations point to 
several reasons against allowing executive officials to directly implement the 
rudimentary concept of lesser evil, or even some general conception of lesser evil. 
                                                                
32For examples of wide executive powers in the context of national security, see 
discussion infra Section V. 
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The first reason is embodied in a central aspect of the democratic conception of 
government and the Rule of Law Principle it entails.  These ideas reflect the 
following division of power among the different branches of government: major 
normative decisions in the public sphere should be made by the elected legislature, 
the formal aspect of the democratic conception, and subject to constitutional review, 
the substantive aspect of the democratic conception. The task of interpreting and 
completing legislative products should be entrusted to the courts, while the executive 
should implement the decisions made by the legislative and judicial branches. 
Obviously, the lines dividing the branches are blurred. Substantial executive 
discretion is a necessary part of the common conception of the modern state and a 
very significant part in practice. Nevertheless, there is tension between the 
democratic conception and entrusting the executive with the discretion to use wide 
powers on central normative issues, unfettered by legislative or judicial guidelines.  
Even if wide and unfettered executive powers are inevitable, they dilute the concept 
of democracy and the rule of law. This is true not only when the executive is not 
subject to any guidelines, but also when its officials implement guidelines that allow 
wide normative discretion with respect to central issues. Some guidelines accord 
such discretion explicitly, while others require such discretion in their 
implementation due to ambiguity.33 Thus, there is a difference between legislative 
and judicial rules and administrative guidelines set by executive officials.  
These ideas are incompatible with empowering executive bodies to act directly in 
light of the rudimentary concept of lesser evil, or even some general conception of 
lesser evil. This fact is due to the wide normative discretion required for the 
implementation of such concepts as they relate to justifying harm to the individual 
interests. In this respect, there is an important difference between the liberty 
accorded to private individuals to act in light of the concept of lesser evil, and the 
corresponding power of public, especially executive officials. Private individuals, it 
might be assumed, would encounter emergencies and take advantage of such liberty 
only rarely. Executive officials, on the other hand, are required not only to prepare 
for various kinds of situations where they have the power to act, but also to seek out 
such situations and to execute their authority. Entrusting executives with wide 
powers of lesser evil thus involves extensive executive discretion.  This discretion 
could be put into practice in a huge variety of situations and could significantly 
affect many individuals.  In light of the democratic conception described above, such 
discretion should be employed by the legislative and judicial branches of government 
rather than by executive authorities. 
There is a related second order reason against bestowing wide and unfettered 
executive powers of lesser evil. This reason concerns the danger of mistake in the 
interpretation and implementation of the idea of lesser evil. This danger is of course 
general in nature.  It applies to every individual and to every governmental 
officeholder who employs his discretion with respect to the concept of lesser evil. 
But there are grounds for assuming that the danger of mistake is more serious, in this 
context, with respect to the executive branch of government. 
Before considering this difference, it is important to note that the danger of 
mistake in applying the concept of lesser evil is generally substantial for several 
                                                                
33For examples of delegation of powers accompanied by such ambiguous standards for its 
employment that its practical import is unguided delegation, see DAVIS, supra note 12, at 27. 
 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
644 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:629 
reasons. One aspect is normative. As previously noted, the proper conception of 
lesser evil is both controversial and difficult to determine. The rudimentary concept 
of lesser evil, i.e., the basic idea that it is sometimes justified to harm one person in 
order to prevent a more serious harm to another, is in itself indeterminate. In fact, it 
is almost empty. Therefore, it is important to look for principles that will give 
content to this basic idea. However, even assuming that we have such principles, that 
they are correct, and that they are incorporated into the law, such principles will be 
necessarily general due to the wide potential of every plausible conception of lesser 
evil in terms of the number and variety of contexts where they might apply. When 
normative standards are of such a high level of generalization, there is a substantial 
possibility of normative mistakes in their implementation.  
An additional source of mistakes is factual.  Implementing standards of lesser 
evil requires not only a normative inquiry, but also a factual assessment of the 
existing circumstances and expected consequences of various possible actions in 
light of normative standards.  This assessment might be especially difficult and prone 
to mistakes in emergencies due to the necessity for immediate decision and action.   
Thus, emergencies do not allow decision-makers time to attempt to ascertain all the 
pertinent facts. 
Mistakes in this context could be of two kinds. First, certain harmful actions 
might be considered justified and/or legal as the lesser evil when, in fact, they are 
neither justified nor legal. Second, certain actions might be considered unjustified 
and/or illegal, though they are, in fact, both justified and legal. Of course, correct or 
mistaken conclusions about justifiability and legality need not go hand in hand, but 
this complexity is not important here. Both kinds of mistakes might have grave 
implications. The first might lead people to perform wrongful and/or illegal harms. 
The second might lead people not to perform justified and/or legal actions, thereby 
allowing unnecessary harms.  
Whether the difference between causing harm as a consequence of the first 
mistake or allowing harm as a consequence of the second mistake is morally 
significant is a controversial question.34  I believe that it is not morally significant in 
itself. 35 Even if it is assumed, however, that this difference is morally significant in 
general, its significance fades, if not altogether vanishes, when the agent is a person 
who has a special duty to act in the context at hand. Public officials are a 
paradigmatic example of people who have such a duty with respect to the actions 
they have the power to perform in their area of responsibility.  
                                                                
34For the view that the distinction between causing harm and allowing harm is morally 
significant, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG  20 (1978); 2 F. M. KAMM, MORALITY, 
MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND STATUS chs. 1-6 (1996); Philippa Foot, The Problem of 
Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5, 10-13 (1967); Jeff 
McMahan, Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid, 103 ETHICS 250-79 (1993); Warren S. 
Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. 
REV. 287-312 (1989). For the view that this distinction is not morally significant in itself, see 
JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE  28-47 (1985); KAGAN, supra note 4, at ch. 3.  
35However, there are many contingent differences between positive and negative duties or 
between acts and omissions in terms of the typical burden they impose. I explain this position 
in Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil: Beyond Deontology, Rights and Utilitarianism, supra 
note 2.  
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The substantial danger of mistake in following the idea of lesser evil is of course 
general.  With respect to executive officials, mistakes are especially serious in 
several dimensions.  First, mistakes of public officials in every branch of the 
government are more significant than mistakes of individual who are not acting in an 
official capacity. One reason for this result is that public authorities’ power is far 
more substantial than the power most individuals possess.  Therefore, a public 
officials’ mistake typically has more severe consequences than a parallel mistake 
made by an individual.  
Public officials’ mistakes are also more serious than an individual’s mistake 
because an official mistake is more likely to repeat itself.  That is, the mistake will 
often compound itself in the same as well as in other areas where the relevant 
authority functions, and, to a lesser extent, in the areas of operation of other public 
authorities.  In comparison, an individual’s mistake in the interpretation or 
implementation of the concept of lesser evil is more likely to be isolated.  
A third consideration previously mentioned is that since actions of public 
officials are considered by many individuals to be an expression of the law, such 
actions influence the behavior of other individuals.36  Thus, mistakes of 
governmental authorities in the interpretation and implementation of the concept of 
lesser evil are more likely to lead to similar mistakes than parallel mistakes of 
individuals.  
Finally, a person executing a public duty is acting on behalf of, and as trustee of, 
the individuals in the relevant jurisdiction.  Therefore, public officials have a special 
duty to employ their discretion in accordance with certain standards, such as proper 
inquiry into the relevant facts and taking account of all pertinent considerations. On 
occasions when a mistake is due to a failure to meet these standards it is thus also a 
breach of the special duty of public officials to observe these standards. 
These considerations point to ways in which public officials’ mistakes in general 
are more serious than mistakes of other individuals.  Still, public officials must make 
such decisions since they have powers that private individuals lack. In other words, 
not making such decisions in the public sphere might have significant adverse 
consequences.  The question is thus which public officials should interpret the idea 
of lesser evil in this respect, namely, which governmental branch is most prone to 
mistake in this regard.  It seems that the danger of mistake is generally more 
substantial with respect to the executive branch of government compared to the 
legislative and the judicial branches.  While legislatures and judges are not infallible, 
there is a special danger with respect to the officials of the executive branch that does 
not apply to the other branches of the government.  Since each executive authority is 
entrusted with a specific task, there is a danger that its officials' perspective will be 
more limited than that of the legislature and judiciary.  In particular, executive 
officials will typically consider themselves and will be considered by many others as 
mainly responsible for the specific task with which they are entrusted.  Executives 
thus tend to accord excessive weight to the promotion of this task while 
underestimating the importance of other considerations.  This is especially true when 
other considerations clash with the promotion of the executive’s task.37  
                                                                
36See supra Section II. 
37For example, it was recently claimed that: “Liberal democracies consistently overreact to 
terrorist threats, as if their survival were in jeopardy . . . . The historical record suggests, 
disturbingly, that majorities care less about deprivation from liberty that harm minorities than 
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Thus, while administrative guidelines in general are an important tool that might 
reduce the risk of mistake, they are still exposed to this danger.  
Still, general guidelines might be useful in one important respect.  The danger 
that officials will tend to give excessive weight to the promotion of their immediate 
task is especially substantial in real or apparent emergencies.  In such cases, 
guidelines could play a role in reducing the danger of an excessive reaction. Of 
course, in emergencies there will be a tendency to ignore general guidelines or 
consider them inapplicable and thus deviate from them.  In addition, emergencies 
would no doubt also influence the decisions of non-executive officials such as 
legislators and judges.38  
A related reason against allowing executive authorities to interpret and 
implement the general idea of lesser evil is the danger of incoherence, and even 
contradiction, between decisions of various authorities. Even if one does not accept 
the view that coherence is the basis for the political legitimacy of the law,39 
incoherence is undesirable since it leads to inequality.  Aside from any independent 
moral significance,40 inequality typically has various adverse consequences. This is 
especially true if inequality is the result of government actions. The dangers of 
incoherence and inequality are obviously general ones. Yet they seem especially 
significant with respect to the executive branch, compared to the other branches of 
government. The pertinent difference between the legislative branch and the 
executive branch, in this respect, is that legislative products are more general than 
administrative decisions, which are made by various executive authorities or officials 
in a specific area of responsibility.  Therefore, executive decisions are more prone to 
                                                           
 
they do about their own security. This historical tendency to value majority interests over 
individual rights has weakened liberal democracies.” IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:  POLITICAL 
ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR, supra note 15, at ix.  It seems that this danger is especially acute 
with respect to the executive branch of the government. 
38For a discussion of the use of torture in interrogations, see Bruce Ackerman, The 
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042-43, 1072 (2004) ("Security services can 
panic in the face of horrific tragedy. With rumors flying about, amid immense pressures to 
produce results, there will be overwhelming temptations to use indecent forms of 
interrogation. This is the last place to expect carefully nuanced responses . . . judges are no 
more immune from panic than the rest of us. To offset the rush toward torture in an 
emergency, they would be obliged to make their hearings especially deliberate and thoughtful. 
But if they slow the judicial proceedings down to deliberate speed, the ticking time bomb will 
explode before the torture warrant can issue. Serious deliberation is simply incompatible with 
the panic that follows a terrorist attack.").  
39See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 22, at 225-75. 
40For the view that equality is not morally significant in itself, see HARRY G. FRANKFURT, 
Equality as a Moral Ideal, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS 134-35 (1988) ("What is important from the point of view of morality is not that 
everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone would have 
enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others."); H. L. A. 
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 845 (1979) ("The evil is the denial 
of liberty or respect; not equal liberty or equal respect: and what is deplorable is the ill-
treatment of the victims and not the relational matter of the unfairness of their treatment 
compared with others."). 
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incoherence and inequality. There are two pertinent differences, in this respect, 
between the judiciary and the executive. First, though precedent is significant both 
normatively and practically in the administrative sphere, the normative force and 
actual effect of precedent is stronger in courts' decisions.  Second, judiciary decisions 
are made by a substantially smaller number of judges than executive decisions, 
which are made by a huge number of officials and are therefore more prone to the 
danger of incoherence and inequality.  Administrative guidelines do not address the 
problem of incoherence between different executive bodies since they are typically 
set by each executive body separately.  This danger may be mitigated, however, by 
the fact that administrative guidelines are often advanced publicity and thereby 
expose the policy of different bodies to comparison, and thus to critical assessment 
based on this comparison. 
The importance of monitoring executive powers as a way of preventing mistakes 
and abuse of power and thus unjustified harms to individuals is an additional 
consideration against allowing executive authorities to apply directly the rudimentary 
concept of lesser evil.  Due to the extensive normative and even more extensive 
actual powers of executive authorities, including the actual power of executive 
officials to conceal many of their actions, it is both important and difficult to 
effectively check the powers of executive authorities.  Monitoring executive actions 
can be done by inquiring into the substantive justification for each action.  But this 
kind of inquiry is often difficult, especially since it is often hard to ascertain all the 
relevant considerations and facts independently without reliance on the acting 
authority.  Detailed rules that guide the executive body in the relevant area are a 
particularly useful tool for monitoring executive actions.   When such rules exist, it is 
possible to examine the compatibility between the rules and the executive actions.41 
It is more difficult to monitor wide and unguided powers effectively.  Therefore, this 
is another reason for more detailed powers, rather than powers to act in light of 
general and vague principles. This consideration is particularly pertinent with respect 
to the power to interpret and implement the notion of lesser evil, due to the 
indeterminate nature of this rudimentary notion, its wide potential and the inherent 
harm its implementation involves. Administrative guidelines can set standards that 
will encourage scrutiny. But administrative guidelines might be less effective than 
legislative and judicial guidelines due to their more elastic and informal nature. 
Finally, the last second order reason against bestowing wide authority upon 
executive authorities to interpret and implement the idea of lesser evil in their area of 
responsibility concerns the special indirect effects that governmental actions 
typically carry, in terms of the legitimizing similar actions in other contexts.42 As 
previously noted, the performance of certain harmful actions might be justified as the 
lesser evil in terms of their direct effects, while the enactment of laws permitting or 
authorizing the same actions, as well as the actual performance of such actions by 
public officeholders, might have the indirect negative consequence of encouraging 
similar actions in situations where they are unjustified, even in terms of their direct 
effects. This consideration should be taken into account in determining the nature of 
executive powers to act on lesser evil grounds. Particularly, this consideration 
provides an additional reason against wide and unfettered executive powers of lesser 
                                                                
41Cf. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 66. 
42See supra Section II. 
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evil, since the severity of the above danger is dependent on the breadth of the power. 
There is a difference in terms of the message conveyed by a power to perform a 
certain action in detailed circumstances and the message conveyed by a wide power 
to perform any action that is considered to be the lesser evil. The message conveyed 
by the second kind of power is obviously much more exposed to the danger of 
mistaken interpretation.  
At this point, two aspects of Sanford Kadish’s analysis of this issue seem 
problematic.  The first aspect concerns the nature and extent of this danger, and the 
other concerns its implications.  Kadish’s analysis reflects the assumption that there 
is a substantive distinction between the enactment of laws permitting or authorizing 
the performance of certain actions and the actual performance of such actions by 
public officials.  Kadish assumes that the danger of conveying a false message of 
legitimizing the performance of similar actions in other contexts is present only with 
respect to the enactment of law, but not with respect to the actual performance of 
such actions by public officials.  Therefore, he concludes that there might be 
situations where it is unjustified to enact laws permitting lesser evil actions, even 
though the performance of such actions is justified by individuals and by public 
officials.43  He argues that the use of force in interrogations to extract information 
that could prevent acts of terror is one such example.  
This position raises two difficulties. First, the sharp line between enacting laws 
that permit or authorize certain actions and the actual performance of such actions by 
public officials, in terms of their legitimizing effects, seems too sweeping. Though a 
general and explicit law has special declaratory meaning, the performance of actions 
by executive officials, even without an explicit legal authorization, might also 
convey a strong message of legitimizing similar actions.  This possibility is 
especially strong when such actions are supported by other governmental authorities 
that do not enact an explicit prohibition on the performance of such actions in the 
future or set forth criminal or disciplinary sanctions against the public official who 
performed harmful actions without authorization.44  Second, the difficulty of 
Kadish’s position is that entrusting wide discretion to public officials to act on lesser 
evil grounds with no limitation or guidance in the law is contrary to the 
considerations discussed in this section against such discretion.45  
The above considerations emphasize the importance of both the nature and the 
level of generality of rules empowering executive actions of lesser evil. The 
existence of an authorizing rule does not, by itself, reflect these considerations. Wide 
authorization rules that do not provide real guidance with regard to their content 
frustrate most of the reasons underlying the requirement for authorization.  In light of 
these reasons, authorization rules are meaningful only if they go beyond a certain 
                                                                
43Kadish, supra note 18, at 355. 
44The possibility of such legitimation by the legal system is mentioned by Kadish in this 
context and extensively explored by him elsewhere. See id.; KADISH & KADISH, supra note 11. 
45It should be noted, however, that Kadish assumes that in the context he discusses—the 
use of force in interrogations in order to extract information that might help prevent acts of 
terror—this discretion would lead to the performance of actions on lesser evil grounds only 
rarely. See Kadish, supra note 18, at 355.  In the next section, I note that this assumption 
might be misguided in light of the evidence that coercive interrogational means were used in 
Israel for many years without legal authorization.  
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level of specification with respect to the identity of the authorized officials, the 
authority's triggering conditions, and the kind of authorized action.  These reasons 
support as much specification as possible in all of the above respects.  
The considerations discussed in this section point to several important differences 
between allowing a general liberty of individuals to act on lesser evil grounds and 
wide executive powers of this kind. Though general defenses of lesser evil might be 
indispensable for private individuals, these differences might justify a different 
approach in the public sphere. Wide and unfettered executive powers to interpret and 
implement the idea of lesser evil in its rudimentary and general form bestow 
enormous discretion upon public officials due to the extensive potential reach of the 
notion of lesser evil. Therefore, such powers are contrary to the considerations 
mentioned in this section. These considerations support the view that the notion of 
lesser evil in the administrative sphere should take the form of specific rules of 
authorization.  Such rules should include the contexts and conditions in which public 
officials are authorized to perform lesser evil actions and should instruct officials 
regarding the nature of such actions.  Administrative guidelines can perform this task 
to a certain extent, but as previously discussed, there are several differences between 
administrative guidelines and external—legislative or judicial—rules.    
V.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF LESSER EVIL 
The proper relation between the concept of lesser evil and executive powers thus 
requires the resolution of the tension between the considerations for and against wide 
executive powers to interpret and to implement the idea that harm might be justified 
as the lesser evil. This section addresses how this tension is reflected in the nature of 
executive powers to act on lesser evil grounds of several legal systems.  In particular, 
it will examine the arguments made in Israel concerning the use of force in 
interrogations in order to prevent acts of terror.  
The broadest and most vague legal source for executive powers of lesser evil are 
general criminal and tortious defenses that exempt individuals who perform harmful 
actions in extraordinary circumstances.  These defenses are sometimes thought to 
reflect considerations of lesser evil.  Examples of such defenses include, in addition 
to explicit lesser evil defenses, self-defense, defense of others and the defenses of 
necessity and duress.46  Reliance on such defenses as a basis for executive power 
reflects a view emphasizing the reasons in favor of granting executive bodies wide 
powers to act on lesser evil grounds, while ignoring or at least significantly 
downplaying the reasons against such powers.  This is so since these defenses 
include only very general and vague conditions, such as reasonableness or 
proportionality, and are relevant in many kinds of situations without clear limitations 
on the nature of the actions they encompass.  In fact, these defenses do not even 
clearly reflect one rationale, particularly a lesser evil rationale.  As previously noted, 
though, these defenses are sometimes invoked as a basis for exempting individuals 
who performed harmful actions as the lesser evil.  The reliance on these defenses 
does not contribute much to the elucidation of the nature of actions that are justified 
on lesser evil ground in specific situations beyond what is implied by concept of 
lesser evil itself.  But as previously discussed, this notion in itself is almost empty of 
any substantive content. Reliance on such general defenses as a basis for executive 
                                                                
46See supra Section III. 
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actions merely pays lip service to the Legality Principle while ignoring its 
substantive grounds.  
Some legal systems draw a general distinction between the acts of private 
individuals and public officials that are based on lesser evil grounds.  While 
individuals have the liberty to follow general principles of lesser evil directly, a more 
restricted approach is taken with respect to the powers of executive officeholders.47 
Particularly, it was suggested that general principles of lesser evil in various legal 
systems constitute only a necessary condition for actions of public officials based on 
lesser evil grounds.  It is claimed that the emphasis of various legal systems in the 
public sphere is on procedural rules that constrain the powers of executive officials 
to act on lesser evil grounds as opposed to the general principles that apply to private 
individuals.48
Similarly, it has been suggested that in England the criminal defense of necessity 
is not a basis for governmental powers:  
The courts are not supposed to extend governmental powers merely by 
reference to the necessities of government. If the Government wants 
powers, it must obtain them from Parliament; and when it has obtained 
them, it must keep within them, not stretch them under the plea of 
necessity.  Th[is] principle is not regarded as impeding the grant of 
powers at common law for certain recognized purposes, such as the 
preservation of peace and the saving of life.49  
In Germany, the distinction between the private and the public sphere with 
respect to lesser evil actions is reflected in the doubt that exists regarding whether 
the criminal defense of necessity, which is explicitly based on the concept of lesser 
evil, also applies in the public sphere.50 In Denmark, there is a distinction between 
the general self-defense, which applies to individuals, and a special self-defense, 
which applies only with respect to the actions of public officials.51
In Israel, the relationship between executive powers and general principles of 
lesser evil, as reflected in general criminal defenses, was debated in a specific 
context. The question was whether the notion of lesser evil, as reflected in the 
criminal defense of necessity, could provide moral justification and legal ground for 
the employment of special interrogation measures, including force, in order to extract 
information that might enable security authorities to thwart impending acts of terror. 
A national commission of inquiry explored whether special interrogation measures 
are morally justifiable and legal in light of the concept of lesser evil and the criminal 
defense of necessity. The commission concluded such measures were morally and 
                                                                
47Public officials, including executive officials, typically have a general criminal defense 
of executing their authority. This defense requires specific authorization and  is derived from 
the administrative rules of authority and cannot add to them.  See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW 424 (1997).  
48FLETCHER, supra note 25, at. 771-73. 
49WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 610. 
50See Bernsmann, supra note 23, at 184. 
51See LANGSTED ET AL., supra note 26, at 65. 
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legally permissible.52  Subsequently, this view was adopted by the Government's 
legal representatives who defended the practice of employing special interrogation 
means in various circumstances.  Ultimately, this position was endorsed by the 
Israeli Supreme Court, although only implicitly and without a significant analysis. In 
a series of judgments, the Court did not ban interrogation measures and suggested 
that they might be legal, based on the criminal defense of necessity.53
A few years ago, the Supreme Court introduced a variation of this position in a 
comprehensive judgment.  The judgment was comprised of two statements that did 
not resolve the issue definitively.  The Court declared that governmental 
interrogators are not authorized to use special means of interrogations, and force in 
particular, since the "residual power" of the government, which allows it to perform 
"any action that is not explicitly entrusted to a specific executive authority," does not 
include the use of such means. However, the Court continued to adhere to the 
position that the criminal defense of necessity might be applicable to governmental 
officials who use exceptional interrogation measures to extract information that 
might help prevent acts of terror "in the appropriate circumstances."54
This position is ambiguous in several respects. It is plausible to assume that every 
legal system, including Israeli law, incorporates some conception of lesser evil. This 
conception should be subject to special, contrary rules regarding what constitutes the 
lesser evil in specific circumstances.55 It is unclear whether Israeli law includes a 
specific rule that forbids public officials from employing exceptional interrogation 
measures, and force in particular, even when such measures are considered necessary 
in order to extract information regarding impending acts of terror.56 But even 
assuming that Israeli law does include a general conception of lesser evil and does 
not include a specific rule regarding the legality of the use of force in interrogation in 
these circumstances, the Court interpreted the relevant aspect of the general notion of 
lesser evil. Thus, the Court had to decide whether the general notion of lesser evil 
                                                                
52REPORT OF THE COMM’N OF INQUIRY IN THE MATTERS OF INVESTIGATION METHODS OF THE 
GENERAL SEC. SERV. REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (1987) (in Hebrew). An 
English translation of excerpts from this report could be found at 23 ISR. L. REV. 146-88 
(1989). 
53For a survey and analysis of the judgments that were given by the Supreme Court in this 
matter, see Kremnitzer & Segev, Using Force during Investigations, supra note 17, at 671-77; 
Kremnitzer & Segev, Interrogational Torture, supra note 17, at 510-16. 
54HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of 
Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817. For an English translation of the judgment, see 
www.stoptorture.org.il. 
55See supra Section II. 
56 The view that there is such a specific rule could be based on two reasons. First, public 
international law seems to forbid the use of all kinds of torture and ill-treatment and to deny 
any exception to this rule, even at times of war or in emergencies. Since this absolute rule 
reflects a customary international law prohibition, it has the status of internal law in Israel. 
Second, the Israeli Criminal Code includes an offense that forbids the use of force by a public 
servant even when the aim is to reveal information "concerning an offence." This rule might 
apply not only with regard to information concerning an offence that was already committed, 
but also to information that might help prevent future offenses. Both these points are 
elaborated in Kremnitzer & Segev, Interrogational Torture, supra note 17, at 552-55. 
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could be the basis for the use of special interrogation means by public officials in 
order to extract information that might help prevent acts of terror and, if so, when 
such means are legal.  
The Court's answer to this question is ambiguous in two central respects. First, 
the judges did not explain the substantive conclusions implied by the concept of 
lesser evil.  The Court did not define the "appropriate circumstances" where the use 
of special interrogation means might be justified.  Second, the Court did not explain 
the meaning and implication of its seemingly puzzling positionconcerning the 
distinction between the administrative and the criminal spheres. This position implies 
that, when governmental interrogators are not authorized to use special interrogation 
means, presumably even in exceptional circumstances, the criminal defense of 
necessity might nevertheless apply to interrogators who did use such means on 
certain occasions. What is the implication of the applicability of the criminal defense 
absent specific administrative power?  Is it an action that is compatible with the 
defense legal or not?57
The practical outcome of the Court's ambiguous position is to pass the buck to 
the investigating authorities and grant them almost unfettered discretion. This 
possibility raises difficulties regardless of the assumption concerning the moral 
justification and the legal grounding for the use of force in interrogation to extract 
information relating to potential acts of terror as the lesser evil.  If the assumption is 
that the law does sanction the use of force in interrogations, once certain conditions 
are met, then the Court's abstention from an explicit declaration to that effect, 
accompanied by an elucidation of these conditions, might prevent justified actions 
that save people's lives since interrogators will not know that such actions are within 
their powers. On the other hand, if the assumption is that the law does not sanction 
the use of force in interrogations, either absolutely or if certain conditions are not 
met, then the Court's position might lead to unjustified means of interrogation, due to 
the interrogators' assumption that such acts are within their power.  In any case, the 
practical implication of the Court's position is to shift one of its main responsibilities, 
the interpretation of a complex legal notion while important interests are at stake, to 
an executive body. In light of this judgment, security officials are required to 
interpret and implement the complex idea of lesser evil in a difficult context without 
any real guidance with respect to its content and proper manner of implementation.   
The Court's ambiguous position cannot be the last word on the subject.  It was 
clear that not every interrogator would act in light of his personal judgment on each 
occasion, and that some general policy would be adopted by the relevant security 
authorities.  Indeed, the available evidence suggests that, contrary to several initial 
assumptions, the use of force in interrogation has not ceased after the Court’s 
judgment was delivered.  Though there were some changes in the kinds of measures 
used, it is hard to find a principled distinction between the previous policy and the 
new one.58
                                                                
57For an analysis of the judgment in general, and of this position in particular, see id. at 
516-59. 
58For discussions of the policy of the security service after the judgment, see THE PUBLIC 
COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, BACK TO A ROUTINE OF TORTURE: TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN DETAINEES DURING ARREST, DETENTION AND INTERROGATION – 
SEPT. 1999 TO SEPT. 2001 (2003), available at www.stoprtorture.org.il; THE PUBLIC COMM. 
AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, FLAWED DEFENSE: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN GSS 
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The issue of the use of force in interrogation as a means of extracting information 
to help prevent acts of terror demonstrates the considerations discussed in the 
previous section against wide executive powers to interpret and implement the 
concept of lesser evil. It is possible and appropriate to roughly determine the nature 
and scope of the power to interrogate people suspected of having information 
concerning future acts of terror. This kind of situation is unfortunately often, perhaps 
even routinely, encountered by security services in Israel and is thus obviously not 
impossible to predict. Therefore, the legislature—or in its absence, the judiciary—
should have made the decision regarding what means are justifiable in these kind of 
situations rather than leave this decision to the interrogators themselves without 
meaningful guidance.  
 Entrusting the power to interpret and implement the concept of lesser evil to 
security officials has indeed led to the dangers discussed in the previous section. One 
such danger is the possibility of mistake. There seems to be wide agreement among 
philosophers and lawyers who study this subject seriously that the use of force in 
interrogation might be justified only in extraordinary circumstances, primarily when 
strong evidence exists that force is the only way to prevent severe harm to many 
people.59 The general agreement regarding this proposition might be misleading in an 
important respect.  Such views are typically left in this abstract level, without much 
elaboration regarding the nature of the harm sought to be avoided, the force that 
could be used, and the evidence required with respect to the existence of the danger 
and the ways of preventing it.  Yet it seems clear that the common view of those who 
have seriously considered the subject does not support the policy adopted by the 
security officials in Israel with regard to the reliance on the concept of lesser evil as 
the basis for the use of force and other special interrogation means in a large number 
of situations.  
This mistaken policy could be attributed to the materialization of another danger 
mentioned in the previous section: that executive officials will tend to attach more 
than the appropriate weight to the specific duty for which they are entrusted.  Thus, 
discovering information concerning possible acts of terror could come at the expense 
of other, more important considerations. In any case, the bottom line is that the 
virtually unfettered discretion of security officials often led to the employment of 
unjustified and severe interrogational means, sometimes for prolonged periods.  
Finally, this issue demonstrates the danger of abuse of power by executive 
officials and the difficulty of employing effective supervision on executive powers, 
especially with respect to wide and vague powers. The use of force in interrogations 
in Israel was concealed for years, during which security officials have intentionally 
                                                           
 
INTERROGATIONS FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT RULING – SEPT. 1999 TO SEPT. 2001 
(2001), available at www.stoptorture.org.il.  See also Kremnitzer & Segev, Interrogational 
Torture, supra note 17, at 530-31. 
59See the sources mentioned in Kremnitzer & Segev, Using Force during Investigations, 
supra note 17, at 712-13; Kremnitzer & Segev, Interrogational Torture, supra note 17, at 543-
54. 
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and systematically misled the courts.60 In addition, interrogators exceeded internal 
instructions regarding the measures they were permitted to employ.61  
VI.  A PARTIAL SOLUTION: INTERMEDIATE GUIDELINES 
What is the conclusion that should be drawn, in light of the discussion in the 
previous sections, with respect to the desired nature and scope of executive powers 
to act on lesser evil grounds? Wide and unfettered executive powers to act directly in 
light of the rudimentary concept of lesser evil, or even in light of some general 
substantive conception of it, such as powers to implement vague criminal or tortious 
defenses, should not be granted. The question is thus how to address the difficulty of 
formulating more detailed instructions concerning the scope of executive powers to 
implement the notion of lesser evil, especially in contexts where there might be a 
strong justification to perform harmful acts as the lesser evil.  A partial solution to 
the problem is comprised of two parts: legislative and judicial.  The main solution 
should be based on an attempt to strike a proper legislative balance with regard to the 
level of generality of lesser evil powers.  Generally, executive powers based on the 
notion of lesser evil should be intermediate in their level of generality, between wide 
powers to act directly in light of general principles of lesser evil and detailed powers 
to perform specific actions that are justified as the lesser evil.  Such powers should 
be conferred only in situations where there is indeed a genuine difficulty in 
specifying in exhaustive details the actions that might have a lesser evil justification. 
Moreover, such powers should be conferred only in situations where it is difficult to 
specifically identify in advance actions that might have a strong lesser evil 
justification.  These powers should include guidelines that instruct specific executive 
officials regarding the way general principles of lesser evil should be applied in 
specific kinds of conflicts that might arise in their area of responsibility.  The 
guidelines should include limitations concerning the actions that might be performed 
in each situation. 
The legislative guidelines concerning the proper way to implement the concept of 
lesser evil should refer to every aspect with respect to which specification is 
possible.  These aspects should generally include the identity of the officeholders 
who have the power to execute the power at hand, the kinds of interests that conflict 
between them as the basis for employing the power, and the nature of the conflict 
between these interests.  Furthermore, the guidelines should take into consideration 
the seriousness and the probability of the danger that justifies the execution of the 
power, the magnitude of the harm that it is permissible to inflict to confront the 
danger, and the limitations on the way the power should be executed, taking into 
account the possibility of mistake.  This kind of intermediate powers should, 
moreover be limited with respect to every executive authority that is entrusted with 
them, to the center, rather than the periphery, of its area of responsibility.  This will, 
ensure that lesser evil actions will be carried out by officeholders who have the best 
available resources, knowledge and skills necessary for their proper execution. 
                                                                
60Kremnitzer & Segev, Interrogational Torture, supra note 17, at 511-14; Kremnitzer & 
Segev, Using Force During Investigations, supra note 17, at 677-80. 
61STATE COMPTROLLER OFFICE, EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT ON THE GENERAL SECURITY 
SERVICE INTERROGATION ARRAY IN THE YEARS 1988-1992 (2000) 4-5 (in Hebrew). 
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For example, it is possible to decide that officials responsible for the protection 
of public health should have the power to make use of private property, even if this 
power involves damage to property, if this is the only way to prevent dangerous 
materials from spreading and thereby creating a real danger to people's lives or 
health. This power should be constrained, however, by detailed and fact-specific 
guidelines as to when it is appropriate to invoke such power. First, the legislation 
should specify the kinds of dangerous materials that would justify the use of this 
power. Second, the legislation should include factors such as the quantity of the 
material involved and the population or environment at risk in order to ensure that 
only a real danger to life or serious bodily harm might justify the use of this power.  
Third, the law should describe, at least in general terms, the kinds of use that might 
be made of private property.  Guidelines should be developed specifying when it is 
acceptable to commandeer private property to combat a threat.  For example, in what 
condictions private property such as cars could be used to block contaminated roads 
that lead to contaminated areas.  Finally, the rules should include limitations that 
clarify that the authorized use does not extend to actions that create a significant 
danger to human life or of serious bodily harm, e.g., blocking roads by using a 
physical object that is not accompanied by adequate warning signs. 
This kind of legislative guidance does not necessarily include an exhaustive list 
of actions that can be carried out in the pertinent context based on lesser evil 
grounds. Thus, in the above example, the law does not necessarily need to include an 
exhaustive and detailed list of the kinds of private property that could be damaged or 
the exact procedure of forfeiture of that property.  This kind of power might be 
proper in situations where there is a significant difficulty in establishing regular 
exhaustive and detailed powers to perform harmful actions that might be the only 
way of preventing more serious harm.  
Appropriate intermediate powers of this kind could substantially alleviate the 
tension between the reasons for and against wide executive lesser evil powers.  
Intermediate powers would authorize actions based on lesser evil principles but 
would not allow such actions without appropriate restrictions to prevent inflicting 
unjustified harms to individuals.62
The basic solution of legislation that includes such intermediate powers should 
also be supplemented by the judiciary.  Courts should make the authoritative 
decision with respect to the interpretation of such powers in two kinds of situations. 
First, absent an imminent danger, an administrative official presented with a situation 
that may call for a lesser evil action should consult a court to confirm whether 
tacking a specific action is authorize by the executive’s intermediate power.  
Due to the exigencies of a particular emergency, prior judicial authorization may 
be impossible.  If we require judges to make rapid decisions in time of emergency, 
                                                                
62An example of this kind of power is found in an English judgment  where the court 
upheld an administrative instruction that permitted fire engines to ignore traffic lights in 
emergencies and specified the precautions that should be taken before doing so.  The judges 
correctly noted that such an instruction is preferable to the previous situation of unfettered 
discretion on behalf of the drivers. See Buckoke v. Greater London Council (1971) 2 All E. 
254, 256, 258-59, 263-64, 266-67 (C.A.). 
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we can generally expect no more than a judicial rubber stamp for decisions taken by 
executive officials.63  
In light of this possibility, a second rule should apply if an executive action was 
performed in light of lesser evil principles, without prior judicial authorization.  In 
this situation, a court should decide in retrospect whether the action was indeed 
justified. Such a review would help guide executive officials regarding the proper 
interpretation and implementation of intermediate lesser evil powers in the future. 
The judicial aspect of the proposed solution is based not only on the general 
reasons for entrusting the courts with the power to make authoritative decisions 
regarding the interpretation of legislative rules.  It is also based on the assumption 
that judicial decision-making would typically lead to more appropriate conclusions, 
with respect to the content and boundaries of lesser evil standards, compared to 
unchecked administrative discretion.  This assumption is based on a previously 
mentioned reason: there is a better chance that courts will take a proper account of all 
the interests involved in a particular conflict, compared to the executive officials who 
are responsible for the protection or promotion of a particular aim.  This is based on 
the assumption that executive officials will tend to place more weight on the 
particular aim while underestimating conflicting interests.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concept of lesser evil represents an important moral idea that should be 
reflected in the law.  However, the institutional context of the law creates a difficult 
dilemma concerning the implementation of this concept, particularly with respect to 
emergencies.  If no general lesser evil powers are granted to the executive branch of 
the government, serious harm that it is both possible and justifiably preventable 
might take place.  If such powers are granted, however, there is a serious danger that 
they might be employed improperly.  The aim of this paper was to explore this 
dilemma.  The solution suggested to this dilemma does not solve it completely. But I 
believe that it reflects the most important reasons for and against bestowing lesser 
evil powers upon governmental authorities to deal with emergencies. 
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